‘Killing hasn’t stopped’: Pahlavi asks US to intervene on humanitarian grounds

The Australian digital edition, Monday, February 16, 2026

by Joe Kelly 

Debate under this article 

Subscriber 1: American interference in Iran is a product of empire. It is all about geopolitical primacy and dominance (ref John Mearsheimer). Iran is a highly educated oil-rich country and so must be controlled by the empire. It was American interference that bought about the Islamic government in 1979. It was American interference that ended the regime of Prime Minister and national hero Dr Mohammad Mossadegh who nationalized Iranian oil in 1951. It was American interference that aided and abetted Saddam Hussein in his war against Iran. And it is American interference today that wants to overturn the Islam Republic in the name of democracy. You can blame US President Jimmy Carter for the regime with which they now want to interfere. 

“In 1979, President Carter’s administration with the help of the Muslim citizens bought back the Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, who was exiled to France for seventeen years by the Shah, and put him in power in Iran (BBC documentary, February 2009, ‘Fall of a Shah’). During the Cold War, because of the unpopularity of the Shah, the communist party of Iran, Hezbe Toodeh, that opposed the Shah, had enormous membership. President Carter and his administration assumed that Iran would be a communist country if they didn’t replace the Shah” (ref. ‘The Power and the Peril of Oil’ by Firooz Eftekhar Zadeh, published 2014)


Reply

Subscriber 2: Sadly the history of the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 tells us that your interpretation leaves out salient facts. Because of the excesses of the Shah and his secret police, national wide protests led to the Shah voluntarily abdicating and fleeing Iran. It had nothing to do with alleged American interference. The US played no role in bringing back Khomeini. It was not in their interests to do so as other than Israel, it was under the Shah the only US ally in the region. The Carter administration did not replace the Shah. It was a totally home grown revolution. He left to save his own skin. Iranian PM Bakhtiar invited Khomeini back from exile in France to Iran despite opposition from the US. The rest is history. The ensuing struggle between pro-Khomeni forces and those loyal to the Shah saw the Ayotollah decisively defeat his opponents. The Shah, whilst moving from country to country looking for sanctuary was diagnosed with prostate cancer. The US offered him temporary sanctuary so he could be treated in that country. The uproar over Carter’s act of compassion was one of the main factors that prompted the US embassy hostage crisis. The Shah was eventually being treated in Egypt when the cancer claimed his life.

Subscriber 1: At the time the US did have an interest in misguidedly installing the Islamic religious anti-communist leader Khomeini. Remember it was the Cold War. The US had lost to the Vietnamese communists in 1975. The Soviet Union had not fallen until 1990. The US calculated that an Islamic government in Iran would be an alternative to a likely communist government in Iran. An Islamic government would become a bulwark against the Soviet Union. It was US interference that installed Khomeini as leader in 1979. My authority is the book I quoted in my comment. Iranian writer Firooz Eftekhar Zadeh. 

FOOTNOTE

I forgot.  The age of debate is over. We now have automated intelligence to give us the final word.  

I put this question to DeepSeek.

Did the Carter administration in USA have any role in bringing about Islamist power in Iran in 1979 based on the Cold War logic of preventing the communist party obtaining power in Iran?

Answer. 

The relationship between the Carter administration's Cold War strategy and the rise of an Islamist government in Iran in 1979 is a complex historical question.

The short answer is no, the Carter administration did not actively bring about an Islamist government. However, its deep-seated Cold War focus on containing the Soviet Union and preventing a communist takeover in Tehran inadvertently created a strategic blind spot, causing it to misread the situation and ultimately fail to prevent the Shah's collapse and the Ayatollah's rise .

The following table summarizes the key elements of this dynamic:

Aspect Description Consequence

Cold War Priority "Resist communist expansion" was the "prime directive" of US policy . US focus was on the communist threat, not the Islamist opposition .

View of Opposition Islamists were underestimated; seen as less dangerous than leftists . The growing power of Ayatollah Khomeini's movement was missed .

Failed Strategic Options Carter was torn between supporting the Shah or preparing to deal with a new government . Indecision led to the loss of a powerful autocratic ally without a plan for the aftermath .

Post-Shah Engagement

Sought relationship with the new government to maintain Iran as a "barrier... to Soviet ambitions" . Efforts to build bridges failed; the new regime was fundamentally anti-American .

The "Yes, But" Nuance: A Strategic Blind Spot

The Carter administration's policy was defined by its overriding Cold War logic. Archival evidence and scholarly analysis confirm that the primary goal was to maintain Iran as a stable, anti-Soviet bulwark . This created a strategic blind spot in several key ways:

· Misreading the Threat: US diplomats were so preoccupied with the threat of communism and leftist ideologies that they failed to appreciate the power and nature of the Shi'a Islamist movement led by Ayatollah Khomeini. They saw the opposition through a Cold War lens, focusing on secular nationalists and leftists, and underestimating the religious leadership's ability to mobilize the masses .

· Failed Strategic Options: When the Shah's regime began to crumble, President Carter was caught in a dilemma. He vacillated between supporting the Shah and trying to open a dialogue with moderate opposition figures. While the US sent General Robert Huyser to Tehran in a last-ditch effort to keep the military unified behind a civilian government , the overall approach has been characterized as indecisive. This failure to act decisively to either prop up the Shah or guide a transition opened the door for the more organized and popular forces of the Islamist opposition .

The "No" Perspective: Intent vs. Outcome

While the administration's Cold War mindset contributed to a policy failure, it is crucial to distinguish between intent and outcome. There is no credible evidence that the US plotted or collaborated with Khomeini to install an Islamist government.

· Actively Working Against Khomeini:

At the time, the US was actively trying to limit Khomeini's influence. For example, the Carter administration asked the French government, where Khomeini was living in exile, to restrict his political activities and propaganda against the Shah .

· A Failed Courtship: After the revolution, the US attempted to build a working relationship with the new provisional government of Mehdi Bazargan, precisely to maintain that "barrier" against Soviet influence . This effort at engagement failed, as the new regime was fundamentally hostile to the US, which it labeled the "Great Satan" .

The Historiographical Perspective

This episode has become a foundational case study in US foreign policy debates. Political scientist Jeane Kirkpatrick famously argued in a 1979 article that Carter's human rights advocacy and failure to support the Shah led to the collapse of a "moderate autocrat" and its replacement by a more radical, anti-American regime .

This view has had a lasting impact, often making US presidents wary of abandoning autocratic allies for fear of a similar outcome. A more nuanced historical view, however, points to the administration's misperception of the religious movement as a more significant factor than a naive human rights policy .

In summary, the Carter administration was not an architect of the 1979 Islamist revolution. It was, however, an unwitting casualty of its own Cold War logic. By viewing the crisis through a narrow anti-communist lens, it failed to understand the true nature of the opposition and could not prevent the fall of a key ally, resulting in a profound and enduring strategic defeat for the United States.

I hope this explanation provides a clear and nuanced answer to your question. Would you be interested in learning more about the subsequent hostage crisis or the long-term fallout from these events?

OK, let’s see what Grok has to say with the same question 

Answer

The Carter administration did not actively orchestrate or "bring about" the rise of Islamist power in Iran during the 1979 revolution with the explicit goal of blocking a communist takeover. However, U.S. policy under President Jimmy Carter contributed indirectly to the transition through a combination of human rights pressures on the Shah's regime, inadequate support for the Shah amid growing unrest, and pragmatic engagement with Ayatollah Khomeini's forces to ensure stability and minimize Soviet or communist influence in the region—a key Cold War priority.

### Background and U.S. Policy Leading Up to the Revolution

The U.S. had long viewed Iran as a strategic ally against Soviet expansionism, with the Shah's regime serving as a bulwark in the Middle East.

Carter's foreign policy emphasized human rights and moralism over realpolitik, leading to pressure on the Shah to release political prisoners (including Islamists, communists, and other dissidents) and ease censorship.

This inadvertently fueled opposition movements, as it allowed greater organizing by groups like Khomeini's supporters.

Critics argue this weakened the Shah without a clear plan for what might follow, though the administration initially believed the Shah could manage reforms and maintain control.

Intelligence failures compounded the issue: U.S. assessments underestimated the revolution's momentum until late 1978, and policymakers did not seriously reassess support for the Shah despite warning signs.

Carter publicly distanced the U.S. from intervening in Iran's internal affairs, effectively signaling non-support for the Shah as protests escalated.

### Engagement with Khomeini and Cold War Considerations

As the Shah's position deteriorated in late 1978 and early 1979, the Carter administration engaged in secret back-channel communications with Khomeini's aides in Paris.

These talks aimed to clarify U.S. intentions, prevent a military coup that could lead to civil war, and safeguard U.S. interests—explicitly including avoiding a communist takeover by groups like the Tudeh Party (Iran's communist organization, which had Soviet ties).

Khomeini, for his part, feared U.S. intervention to prop up the Shah and sought assurances against it.

The U.S. viewed Khomeini as anti-communist (a stance he emphasized, as communism was "anathema" to his Islamist ideology), making his regime preferable to a potential leftist or Soviet-backed alternative in the Cold War context.

 After the Shah fled in January 1979 and Khomeini returned, the U.S. quickly recognized the new Islamic Republic, hoping for moderation and continued anti-communist alignment.

This engagement was not about installing Islamists but about managing the fallout to prevent chaos that could invite Soviet influence, especially amid broader regional tensions (e.g., the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan later that year).

U.S. officials briefly considered urging Iranian generals to intervene militarily against either Khomeini or a communist surge but ultimately did not pursue it, opting for neutrality to avoid escalation.

By February 1979, the military surrendered to Khomeini's forces, solidifying Islamist control.

### Aftermath and Legacy
Relations soured rapidly after the revolution, culminating in the November 1979 hostage crisis—triggered partly by Carter allowing the exiled Shah into the U.S. for medical treatment.

Critics, including some conservatives, blame Carter for "losing" Iran by not backing the Shah more forcefully, arguing his policies paved the way for the mullahs.

However, historians note that the revolution's roots (economic inequality, repression, and nationalism) predated Carter, and direct U.S. intervention might have worsened outcomes or drawn Soviet involvement.

In summary, while Cold War anti-communism influenced U.S. decisions—prioritizing stability over the Shah's survival and engaging Khomeini to avert a leftist vacuum—the administration's role was more passive and reactive than proactive in "bringing about" Islamist rule. It accepted the shift as the least-bad option amid limited leverage.